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ABSTRACT—Imagining future events and adjusting current
behavior accordingly is a hallmark of human cognition.
The development of such episodic foresight is attracting
increasing research attention. In this article, I review a
selection of recent work on the emergence of episodic
foresight and its role in different domains, including learn-
ing, deliberate practice, affective forecasting, intertempo-
ral choices, and anxiety. Studies suggest that during the
preschool years, children begin to consider future scenar-
ios, enabling them to plan, prepare, and shape their
future, but many other consequences, such as the role of
developing foresight in anticipating hazards, remain unex-
amined. The potential predictive effects of early individual
differences in episodic foresight on later cognitive capaci-
ties and developmental outcomes deserve closer scrutiny.
KEYWORDS—foresight; planning; mental time travel;
prospection; development; deliberate practice
Over the last 10 years, researchers have shifted from an inter-
disciplinary preoccupation with studying cognitive processes
that track the past to widespread interest in future-oriented cog-
nition. It has become clear that people spend more time imagining
the future than recollecting the past, and even when they recall,
they often do so with a view toward what can be learned for the
future (1). In this article, I review progress in our understanding
of the development of the ability to imagine future scenarios and
organize action accordingly. Different terminology has been used
to describe this capacity, including mental time travel into the
future (2), episodic future thinking (3), episodic foresight (4),
episodic prospection (5), and future-oriented mental time travel
(6). To match the brevity of the term episodic memory, a special
issue of Cognitive Development on this topic suggested using the
term episodic foresight (7), which I do here.
There are a variety of ways in which people can be driven by
thoughts about the future, including semantic prospection about
general regularities and prospective memory for intentions to
perform actions in the future, but the foundational ability is the
capacity to imagine future episodes (8). When we imagine future
scenarios, we can consider the consequences of current events
as well as particularities of situations completely removed from
the here and now. This allows us to flexibly prepare and weigh
options to take advantage of opportunities, manage threats
before they manifest, and shape the future to our design. In
short, episodic foresight is tremendously powerful and can be
regarded as a quintessential human adaptive strategy (6, 9).
In the following sections, I discuss the nature and assessment
of the development of episodic foresight. Then, I explore recent
work on consequences of its emergence. In spite of its remark-
able power, this capacity also comes with a price, so I end with
a brief discussion of the darker aspect of our ability to foresee
future events.
THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISODIC
FORESIGHT
How Do We Do It?
A fundamental problem regarding the future is that it is uncer-
tain. Although episodic foresight may have connotations of cer-
tainty, we are frequently wrong about what will happen. After
all, we are not fortune-tellers or soothsayers. Much of our fore-
sight is based on simple extrapolations from the past, for
instance, when we predict that a past event will reoccur after a
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particular cue or period of time. In fact, considerable evidence
(including from developmental research; 10, 11) suggests that
episodic foresight is linked closely in mind and brain to episodic
memory (8, 12, 13). Indeed, both may be regarded as two sides
of the same coin, even if the future has priority in terms of evo-
lutionary fitness (2). However, given that the future often differs
from the past, episodic foresight involves more than an ability to
predict reoccurrences.
To simulate situations we have never experienced, we need
an open-ended system that can combine and recombine old
information into novel constellations—a flexible system that
allows us to evaluate different possibilities (e.g., in terms of their
value and likelihood of becoming reality). In addition to declara-
tive memories, other component capacities are required to con-
struct useful future scenarios, reflect on options, and embed
them into larger narratives. Michael Corballis and I suggested a
theater metaphor to highlight the diversity of sophisticated com-
ponents involved (8). Like a real show, constructing mental sce-
narios involves a stage where the scene is entertained offline, a
playwright to construct the narrative, actors that simulate acting
in particular ways, and sets that represent objects and physical
forces. Furthermore, something akin to a director is needed to
evaluate and manage the scenarios, as well as an executive pro-
ducer to decide what plan to put into action and a broadcaster to
communicate mental scenarios with others.
As this metaphor should make clear, episodic foresight is not
an encapsulated module, but a faculty that draws on complex
cognitive processes (e.g., working memory, recursive embedding,
theory of mind, spatial reasoning, metarepresentation, executive
functions, and language) that work together. We used the meta-
phor to evaluate the potential capacities of other animal species
given that shortcomings in any one of these domains can limit
foresight. However, it also highlights what young children need
for effective episodic foresight to work (14).
Assessing Children’s Capacities
The simplest way to assess children’s capacity to think about
future situations is to ask them directly (15). Results of studies
using interviews suggest that while 2- and 3-year-olds can report
some information about upcoming events, by ages 4 and 5, chil-
dren can talk more clearly about future situations (11, 15). How-
ever, taking verbal reports at face value poses problems because
children may understand more than they can articulate, and
conversely, they sometimes say things they do not fully under-
stand. Thus, the data should be supplemented with studies that
focus on future-oriented behavior.
Given that actions can be beneficial in the future only inci-
dentally or because of associative learning and inherent predis-
positions, Corballis and I proposed strict behavioral criteria to
rule out such alternative explanations for the apparently future-
directed behavior of young children (and animals). We advo-
cated using single trials to avoid repeated exposure to the same
stimulus–responses relationships, using novel problems to avoid
relevant learning histories, using different temporal/spatial con-
texts for the critical future-directed action to avoid cuing, and
using problems from different domains to avoid specific behav-
ioral predispositions (16).
In studies aimed at meeting these criteria, 4-year-olds behav-
iorally demonstrated such flexible foresight (17). We introduced
children to a novel problem in one room (a box with a certain
tool that yielded a reward or a doll that needed a specific food)
before taking them to another room. After spending 15 min on
unrelated tasks, children were allowed to take one object back
to the first room. Although 3-year-olds selected at chance,
4-year-olds tended to pick the options that allowed them to solve
the problem in the other room. They used memory of a specific
past episode from a spatially removed context and prepared for
a return to these problems when presented with the opportunity.
This finding has been replicated in studies in which selecting
the object was separated by several minutes from returning to
the room with the problem (18). By age 4, children can remem-
ber a novel problem well enough to recognize and secure its
future solution when the chance presents itself.
Although this and similar evidence (19) indicate that by the end
of the preschool years, children have developed some fundamental
prospective capacities, this does not mean that development stops
at this stage or that younger children lack foresight altogether. For
instance, even 3-year-olds begin to qualify statements about the
future with verbal markers of uncertainty (e.g., maybe; 20).
In a recent study, Jon Redshaw and I examined a simple but
fundamental insight about future uncertainty: that it can be pru-
dent to consider more than one possibility and prepare accord-
ingly (21). We designed a minimalist paradigm through which
children could demonstrate such insight. We dropped a desir-
able target into an upside-down Y-shaped tube and gave chil-
dren the opportunity to catch it. Two-year-olds typically
prepared for the drop by placing a hand under only one of the
potential exits, and thus ended up failing on half the trials.
Older children were more likely to prepare for both possibilities,
with most 4-year-olds spontaneously covering both exits to the
tubes from the first trial onwards without subsequently regress-
ing to the less optimal response.
The development of several component processes may drive
this change in response. For instance, with the emergence of
metarepresentational skills around this age (22), children may
be able to reflect on the imagined possibility of the target com-
ing out of one opening and conclude that this representation
may be incorrect, driving them to prepare not only for this but
also for the other possibility. More research is needed to deter-
mine what is supporting the prudent preparation. However, we
now know that by this age, children can consistently prepare for
at least two mutually exclusive versions of an immediate future
event (21). (Chimpanzees and orangutans in this study per-
formed similarly to the 2-year-olds.)
Adults use episodic foresight to prepare for many more diverse,
uncertain, and distant potential situations. We can imagine needs
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we may experience and hazards we may encounter (e.g., on a
planned holiday), which allows us to prepare for eventualities, to
maximize future pleasure and minimize future discomfort. In con-
trast, young children struggle to consider their future needs (23)
and prepare solutions for future problems (24), and this is not
merely a function of poor memory for what is needed (25).
Although by the end of the preschool years, children can prepare
for some future needs, their capacities continue to develop
throughout childhood and adolescence (5). For instance, in a
recent study on narratives and introspections of 5-, 7-, and 9-year-
olds, the development of foresight was more protracted than the
development of episodic memory and required additional skills,
though both capacities improved during middle childhood (26).
A review of the developmental trajectories of the purported
component capacities (see the theater metaphor mentioned ear-
lier) suggests that although several milestones are reached
around age 4, other critical aspects mature relatively late (14).
For instance, children’s working memory capacity, the virtual
stage on which future scenarios are entertained and evaluated,
increases only gradually between ages 4 and 11 (27). More
detailed charting of the development during middle childhood
and beyond is desirable, given how fundamental episodic fore-
sight is to human cognition. In the rest of this article, I consider
consequences of this emerging capacity.
CONSEQUENCES OF EPISODIC FORESIGHT
Shaping One’s Future Self
People make different choices about what information to learn
and what skills to acquire, and this largely accounts for the
diversity in human expertise (28). We can set out to shape our
future selves because we can think ahead and consider our
future beings as continuous with our current selves as well as
potentially different. Once we realize that we can influence that
difference, we can change our future selves intentionally. A
powerful way to do that is practice. Deliberate practice refers to
our capacity to engage in repeated actions with the intention to
improve our future skills (29). Research on deliberate practice
has traditionally focused on the acquisition of outstanding adult
levels of performance in sports and arts (30). However, deliber-
ate practice is critical to the development of many ordinary
skills, from learning how to write to learning a dance. In spite of
the obvious importance of this capacity, little is known about
how children begin to understand and use deliberate practice.
Recently, we have begun to chart this development. In one
study, my colleagues and I gave preschoolers the opportunity to
selectively practice a motor task that would later earn them a
reward if done well (31). Four- and 5-year-olds chose to engage
with the relevant task at above-chance levels; 3-year-olds did
not. In a second experiment, 5-year-olds, but not younger chil-
dren, demonstrated explicit understanding of some of the effect of
practice. Children were told a story about a competition of skills
between two characters, one who tried the relevant skill just once
and another who engaged in the activity every day for a long time.
The older children predicted that the individual who tried repeat-
edly was more likely to win, and most of them stated practice as
the reason. Furthermore, most 5-year-olds and a few 4-year-olds
referred to practice or repetition when asked how they could
improve a skill. Children who recognized that practice could help
them improve were more likely to pick the character who had
practiced in the previous task, and were more likely to practice a
motor task to enhance their own future performance. In a recent
follow-up study, my colleagues and I replicated these findings
with a larger sample and examined competence in older children.
Children’s capacity in this area increased with age: By age 7,
many understood deliberate practice explicitly and practiced for
the future without being prompted.
We can identify similar developments in the context of
acquiring knowledge. Young preschoolers have little under-
standing of how knowledge is formed (32). But by around age 5,
they can distinguish someone who acquired knowledge yester-
day from someone who will acquire it tomorrow, and they can
identify whom to ask to acquire that information themselves
(33). Studies similar to those on deliberate practice described
earlier could chart children’s developing ability to seek out
future-relevant information deliberately. Through aimed acquisi-
tion of knowledge and skills, we can shape the capacities of our
future selves and, to a certain extent, become masters of our
own destiny. The complex relationships between episodic fore-
sight and education deserve closer research attention (5).
Concern for One’s Future Feelings
Episodic foresight allows us to foresee the affective conse-
quences of future events. We care about how the future might
make us feel. In research in social psychology that has exam-
ined this so-called affective forecasting, people typically overesti-
mate the intensity of their future emotional reactions to events
(34). For instance, people’s anticipated emotional distress over
ending a relationship tends to be more extreme than what they
report feeling once the relationship actually ends (35).
Recently, we examined young children’s affective forecasting
to determine if they start off making such biased predictions
(36). In two experiments, children were told they were going to
play games and asked to predict on a 7-point scale of happy to
sad faces how they would feel if they were to win or lose. After
finishing the games, the children were asked to rate how they
felt. In both experiments, preschoolers demonstrated a negative
intensity bias just as adults do. They anticipated that they would
feel sadder after losing a game than they reported feeling after
they lost the game. However, they did not show any sign of a
positive intensity bias (i.e., they did not anticipate feeling hap-
pier than they were after winning). As this was the first study of
this type, the result should be interpreted cautiously. We need
to examine the emergence of affective forecasting more system-
atically, especially given continuing debate about the nature of
the phenomenon (37).
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Intensity bias may have an important function, motivating peo-
ple to avoid negative outcomes to events and strive for positive
ones (38). After all, steps to secure future happiness often have
to compete with more immediate motives, so exaggerating affec-
tive consequences may help increase future orientation. The
development of inhibition of current temptation in view of antic-
ipated greater payoffs in the future has been studied extensively
with Mischel’s marshmallow test (39). Children gradually
improve their ability to resist taking an immediate reward to
receive a larger anticipated reward later (40). Remarkably, indi-
vidual differences in future-oriented control predict a range of
advantages even decades later (41).
Nonetheless, delaying is not always prudent, especially if the
future reward is uncertain or the future in general is anticipated
to be bleak (42). In one study, 4-year-olds adjusted their waiting
time depending on whether the future reward was likely to mate-
rialize. When the experimenter was unreliable in another con-
text, children waited a shorter time for a promised larger reward
than when the experimenter was reliable (43). Even preschool-
ers can adjust their delaying and saving behaviors in light of
changing risk contingencies (44). I suspect that the capacity to
foresee and evaluate future situations and the likelihood of their
hedonic consequences, rather than just the ability to inhibit per
se, is particularly adaptive and predictive of future successes.
However, this is an empirical question that needs to be
addressed in longitudinal research.
Anxiety and Other Troubles
With increasing foresight, children are confronted not only with
opportunities to control and shape the future through planning
and preparation, but also with threats. The future can be fright-
ening and trigger considerable anxiety. In addition to fear in
response to immediate threats, humans can consider potential
future dangers even in the absence of present triggers. This
enables people to avoid or manage dangers well before a threat
is imminent. However, this capacity to autocue anxiety can also
cause distress (45). Persistent worry about remote threats, or
about dangers one cannot control, is problematic. We know little
about the relationship between children’s emerging foresight
and anxiety.
The role of foresight in clinical conditions (e.g., anxiety,
depression, schizophrenia) is increasingly attracting research
attention (46). Impaired foresight is likely associated with many
other behaviors, such as risk perception and drug abuse (47).
Researchers in developmental psychology may want to consider
findings in these fields.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Episodic foresight is a fundamental human capacity that has
only recently become the focus of intensive study. Researchers
have begun to chart the development of this capacity in children
and identify factors influencing its emergence. However, many
important aspects of its role, for instance, in clinical contexts
and applied domains (e.g., preventing accidents), remain largely
unexamined. The potential predictive effects of early individual
differences in episodic foresight on later cognitive capacities and
success in school deserve research attention. I anticipate that
over the coming years, we will see considerably more fruitful
research on the development of foresight and it consequences.
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